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The "Contemporaneous" Traders Who Can
Sue an Inside Trader
by
William K.S. Wang*
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., I the Sec-
ond Circuit held that an inside trading2 defendant was civilly liable for
damages to all persons who purchased the security involved in the open
market during the same period as the inside sale.3 On remand, the dis-
trict court held that "during the same period" meant the period between
the inside trade and dissemination of the nonpublic information. Ac-
cording to the district court, "during the same period" was a term of art
adopted in the district court's initial opinion, which the Second Circuit
affirmed. 4 Under this interpretation, "during the same period" could be
as long as one year if a year elapsed between the inside trade and
dissemination.5
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 1967,
Amherst College; J.D. 1971, Yale Law School. Professor William Painter provided valuable
comments on an early draft. Helpful research assistance was provided by Eric Leitner (class of
1987, Hastings College of the Law), Evelyn Meormish (class of 1988, Hastings College of the
Law), and William Martin (class of 1988, Hastings College of the Law). This article is adapted
from part of a forthcoming book to be published by Little, Brown & Co. on inside trading and
federal anti-fraud regulation.
1. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. In this Article, the terms "inside trading," "inside trade, .... inside purchase," and
"inside sale" refer to trading by anyone (corporate insider or outsider) on any type of material,
nonpublic information about the issuer's profits or about the market for the security. To avoid
confusion, the term "insider trading" will not be used.
3. 495 F.2d at 237. For discussion of Shapiro, see Wang, Trading on Material Nonpub-
lic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom
Under SEC Rule lob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1256-62, 1282-83 (1981).
4. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,377, at 98,877-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). For discussion of this opinion, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1281.
5. But cf Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir.
1981) ("[T]he [Shapiro] district court on remand construed this language ["during the same
period"] to refer to the period of time from the defendants' trades to the public disclosure of
the insider information ... but the entire period in that case was only four days.").
The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code allows a class of plaintiffs similar
to that allowed by the district court in Shapiro. Section 1603 of the A.L.I. Federal Securities
Code prohibits certain forms of inside trading. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1603
(Supp. 1981). If a defendant violates § 1603 "in a manner that would make the matching of
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In a single paragraph, however, a later Second Circuit opinion rede-
fined the proper class of civil plaintiffs in inside trading cases. In Wilson
v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp.,6 the plaintiff bought shares about
a month after the inside traders' sales but before disclosure of the non-
public information. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing:
[t]o extend the period of liability well beyond the time of the insider's
trading simply because disclosure was never made could make the in-
sider liable to all the world. Any duty of disclosure is owed only to
those investors trading contemporaneously with the insider; non-con-
temporaneous traders do not require the protection of the "disclose or
abstain" rule because they do not suffer the disadvantage of trading
with someone who has superior access to information. This court re-
cently reiterated such a limitation on the scope of liability under rule
lOb-5 for insiders trading in the open market:
The knowing use by corporate insiders of non-public information
for their own benefit or that of "tippees" by trading in corporate
securities amounts to a violation of Rule lOb-5 . . .which may
give rise to a suit for damages by uninformed outsiders who trade
during a period of tippee trading.7
The Wilson court cited Judge Celebrezze's Sixth Circuit concurring
opinion in Fridrich v. Bradford.8 Judge Celebrezze was the first circuit
court judge to state that inside traders should be civilly liable to "con-
temporaneous" traders:
It is only when the insider enters the market and creates an informa-
tional imbalance that a duty to disclose is imposed to protect the anon-
ymous investors trading with the insider .... The duty of disclosure is
owed to the class of investors trading contemporaneously with the in-
sider .... 9
Although Judge Celebrezze's opinion has influenced courts in other
circuits, his opinion is not the law of the Sixth Circuit. Judge Engel,
buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous," the defendant "is liable for damages to a person
who buys or sells between (1) the day when the defendant first unlawfully sells or buys and (2)
the day. . .[the relevant material or significant facts] become generally available." ALI FED-
ERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1703(b) (1980). The potential harshness of this broad class of plain-
tiffs is mitigated by a ceiling on the defendant's liability of 100% of the amount of the inside
trader's profits; the court has discretion to increase the ceiling to 150%. ALI FEDERAL SE-
CURITIES CODE § 1708(b) (Supp. 1981). For discussion of these Federal Securities Code pro-
visions and the practical problem of distinguishing between "fortuitous" and "nonfortuitous"
transactions, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1304-11.
6. 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981).
7. Id. at 94-95 (quoting Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir.
1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)) (citations omitted). For discussion of Wilson, see
Wang, supra note 3, at 1279-84.
8. 542 F.2d 307, 323 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977).
9. Id. at 326 (citation omitted). For a discussion of Judge Celebrezze's concurrence in
Fridrich, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1267-69, 1283-84.
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joined by Judge Peck, wrote the majority opinion for the Fridrich panel.
Judge Engel did not endorse Judge Celebrezze's contemporaneous class
of plaintiffs.' 0
On the other hand, Wilson is the law of the Second Circuit, the most
important circuit in securities litigation. Dictum in an Eighth Circuit
opinion, Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp.," may also endorse Wil-
son's contemporaneous class of plaintiffs. At least two district courts in
the Eighth Circuit have so interpreted Laventhall.12 A few district courts
outside the Second and Eighth Circuits have also endorsed the contem-
poraneous class of plaintiffs.13
The Wilson court did not explain the meaning of "contemporane-
ous.' 4 Trading one month after the inside trade is too long; unclear is
whether a day or even an hour also would be too long. Among the unan-
swered questions are the following:
I. When does the class of "contemporaneous" traders open?
II. When does the class of "contemporaneous" traders close?
III. Must "contemporaneous" traders transact in the same place
as the inside trader?
IV. Must "contemporaneous" traders buy or sell the same class of
security of the issuer as that bought or sold by the inside trader?
V. Must "contemporaneous" traders buy or sell a security with
the same issuer as the security bought or sold by the inside trader?
The definition of "contemporaneous" may be important in both pri-
vate civil actions and in SEC civil actions for disgorgement of profits to
possible victims of inside trading. This Article will discuss each of the
above questions left unanswered by the Wilson court.
10. See 542 F.2d 307, 318-23 (6th Cir. 1976). Judge Engel held that the gravamen of the
rule lOb-5 offense of inside trading is the trade, not the nondisclosure. In order to recover from
an inside trader, the plaintiff must demonstrate injury from the trade. Id. The opinion is not
clear whether privity is an alternative basis for recovery. See id. at 321. For discussion of
Fridrich, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1262-67, 1284.
11. 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
12. In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 625, 630 (E.D. Mo. 1984);
Kumpis v. Wetterau, 586 F. Supp. 152, 154 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
13. Two such opinions in the First Circuit are Abelson v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524, 527
(D. Mass. 1986) and Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667, 670 (D. Mass. 1982). In
another case, In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 183-85 (C.D.
Cal. 1976), a district court in the Ninth Circuit also dealt with the issue of which plaintiffs can
sue an inside trader for damages under rule lOb-5. This case arose before the Second Circuit
decision in Wilson but after the Second Circuit decision in Shapiro. The Equity Funding dis-
trict court agreed with Shapiro that an inside trader should be liable not only to the parties on
the other side of the inside trade but to all persons who "during the same period" engaged in
transactions opposite in type to the inside trade. 416 F. Supp. at 185.
14. See Wilson, 648 F.2d at 94-95.
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I. When Does the Class of "Contemporaneous" Traders Open?
Several district courts have held that the class of contemporaneous
traders opens with the first inside trade. In other words, contemporane-
ous trades exclude those before the inside trade. One district court ex-
cluded from the class of contemporaneous traders "a plaintiff whose
trades were completed prior to those of the defendant [inside
trader] ... ,,"5 In dictum, the court explained that a tipper would be
liable only to those plaintiffs who traded after the tippee's trade.16 Simi-
larly, after endorsing the "contemporaneous" trader class, another dis-
trict court barred plaintiffs who bought stock before the alleged inside
trade.17
15. O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 800, 803 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). Cf In re Olympia Brewing Co. See. Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1286, 1298-99 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(plaintiffs' last purchase was on December 31, 1976 and the alleged tip was in February 1977;
plaintiffs had no standing to complain of the inside trading). See generally Gordon v. Hunt,
98 F.R.D. 573, 579 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (silver future contract manipulation case discussing
O'Connor by analogy).
16. O'Connor, 559 F. Supp. at 803 n.4.
17. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667, 670 (D. Mass. 1982). Cf. Stromfield
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 496 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (pre- Wilson but post-
Shapiro opinion dismissing claims by plaintiffs against alleged inside trader defendant because
the plaintiffs traded before defendant's alleged inside trading).
In 1976, a district court in the Ninth Circuit also confronted the issue of who can sue
inside trading defendants under rule 1Ob-5; see In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig.,
416 F. Supp. 161, 183-85 (C.D. Cal. 1976). This case arose before the Second Circuit decision
in Wilson but after the Second Circuit decision in Shapiro. The California district court agreed
with Shapiro that an inside trader should be liable to all persons who "during the same period"
engaged in transactions opposite in type to the inside trade. Id. at 185. The court held: "Aside
from plaintiff's aiding and abetting theory of recovery.... [inside trading] defendants will not
be held liable to prior purchasers ... simply because they [the defendants] sold shares...
without disclosure.., at a later date." Id. at 184 (emphasis added). In other words, the class
of plaintiffs opens with the inside trade.
Surprisingly, a district court in the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff's purchase on
December 18, 1985 was "unquestionably contemporaneous with defendants' December 9, 18,
and 19 sales." Froid v. Berner, 649 F. Supp. 1418, 1421 n.2 (D.N.J. 1986). Apparently, the
court assumed that transactions on the same day must be contemporaneous. The court did not
discuss whether the plaintiff's purchase on December 18 preceded or followed the defendant's
sale on the same day. If the class of plaintiffs opens with the defendant's trade and if the
plaintiff's purchase preceded the defendant's sale, the two transactions on December 18 would
not be contemporaneous. The court either overlooked this possibility or rejected any require-
ment that the defendant's trade precede the plaintiff's transaction.
In at least one case, the SEC brought a civil action against alleged inside traders and
obtained a consent decree ordering the defendants to disgorge their profits; subsequently, the
Commission submitted for judicial approval the following plan of disbursement: disgorgement
of profits to those purchasing anytime on the same day as the defendant's sale. The SEC did
not limit disgorgement to those purchasing after the defendant sold. The district court ap-
proved this approach: "The SEC's decision to define purchasers 'during the period of' defend-
ants' sales as purchasers on the six dates on which defendant's sales took place seems to be
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Logically, someone cannot be a victim of fraud until the fraudulent
behavior occurs. Outside the context of inside trading, a number of fed-
eral courts have said that a plaintiff cannot sue under rule lOb-5 or sec-
tion 10 (b) if the plaintiff's trade took place before the alleged fraudulent
activity.18
II. When Does the Class of "Contemporaneous"
Traders Close?
In his concurrence in Fridrich, Judge Celebrezze suggested that
"contemporaneous" traders would be those who might have been on the
other side of the inside trade. He concurred in the denial of the plaintiffs'
standing to sue because "they entered the market weeks after Appellants
[the defendants] had ceased trading, [and] none of the shares they [the
plaintiffs] sold could possibly have been purchased by Appellants." 19
Earlier in his concurring opinion, Judge Celebrezze explained that he
would allow contemporaneous traders to sue because of the perceived
difficulty of identifying the party on the other side of the inside trade.20
appropriate in this case." SEC v. Andes, No. 82-1659, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library).
18. E.g., Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 104647, reh'g en banc
denied, 806 F.2d 1070 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1604 (1987); Ohashi v. Verit
Indus., 536 F.2d 849, 853-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976); Bosio v. Norbay
See., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1566 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Hudson v. Capital Management Int'l.,
Inc., 565 F. Supp. 615, 622 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Shamrock Assocs. v. Moraga Corp., 557 F.
Supp. 198, 204 (D. Del. 1983); Mendelssohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069,
1088 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Wittenberg v. Continental Real Estate Partners, LTD-74A, 478 F.
Supp. 504, 508-10 (D. Mass. 1979); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 114849, 1153
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Wolford v. Equity Resources Corp., 424 F. Supp. 670, 671 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Corp. v. Bollo, 421 F. Supp. 908, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on
other grounds, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977); Kogan v. Nat'l Bank of N. Am., 402 F. Supp.
359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112, 120-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Annotation, Fraud or Deceit as "In Connection With" Purchase or Sale of
Securities Within Meaning of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) (15 USC § 78(b)) and
SEC Rule lob-5," 3 A.L.R. FED. 819, § 8 (Supp. 1986).
19. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
For discussion of Judge Celebrezze's concurrence, see supra text accompanying notes 8-9;
Wang, supra note 3, at 1267-69.
20. 542 F.2d at 324 (Celebrezze, J., concurring) ("Since the mechanics of the market-
place make it virtually impossible to identify the actual investors with whom an insider is
trading, the duty of disclosure is owed to.investors as a class who trade on the market during
the period of insider trading.") (footnote omitted). Later in his opinion, Judge Celebrezze
noted that "to accomplish the deterrent and compensatory purposes of lOb-5, it is better to be
overinclusive in the definition of the plaintiff class than underinclusive. Id. at 326 n. 11 (Cele-
brezze, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Judge Celebrezze is vague on what he means by the party "on the other side" of the inside
trade. Apparently, Judge Celebrezze believed that the victims of a stock market inside trade
are those "on the other side" of the transaction, disregarding any "intermediary." See
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Under Judge Celebrezze's approach, the contemporaneous period would
Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 324 & nn.3-4, 325 & n.7, 326 & n. 11. In any event, Judge Celebrezze's
definition of "on the other side" is unusual. The normal definition of someone "on the other
side" of a trade is a party in contractual privity. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1126-27 (6th ed. 1987) ("[The plaintiff executes a
transaction on the other side of the market contemporaneously with the defendant's, but their
transactions are not with each other (i.e., there is no 'privity').").
Other courts and commentators have emphasized the difficulty of identifying the party in
contractual privity with a stock market inside trader. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[O]n an anonymous national securities
exchange... as a practical matter it would be impossible to identify a particular defendant's
sale with a particular plaintiff's purchase."); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667,
669 (D. Mass. 1982) (quoting the above language in Shapiro); see 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION
AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, § 260.03[c][vii][C], 11-110 to 11-111 (2d ed. rev. 1987).
Cf. SEC v. Courtois, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,000 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (defendant faced both criminal charges brought by U.S. Attorney and civil complaint
brought by SEC; pursuant to a plea agreement, the court initially ordered disgorgement of
inside trading profits into a fund to be distributed to parties in contractual privity with inside
traders or, if that was not feasible, to the U.S. Treasury; the court agreed with the Special
Escrow Agent Report that it was not feasible or practicable to distribute the disgorgement
fund to parties in privity with inside traders).
Identifying the party in contractual privity may not be as difficult as Judge Celebrezze
believed. The task is easier if the inside trade is small, and the volume of the security traded is
also small. See Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Ex-
changes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 312 n.120 (1974) ("The problem of tracing transactions
through the exchange so as to determine with whom the insider traded has probably been
overstated. Brokers do have records of their transactions.... Of course, as the volume on the
exchange increases, the problem of tracing becomes more difficult."). Cf. SEC v. Golconda
Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (pursuant to consent decree, inside
trading defendants deposited profits with a trustee, who used his best efforts to locate the
persons with whom the defendants traded; trustee was able to locate some, but not all, of those
who transacted with defendants).
Apparently, the automation of the parts of the over-the-counter market has made it some-
what easier to recreate transactions there. See The SEC's Spy System: Monitoring Com-
puters-and Fielding Tips, Bus. WK., April 23, 1984, at 29, 30 ("The NASD ... can now
recreate stock trades by identifying the serial numbers of terminals where they originated.").
But cf. Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., No. 84-0714, slip op. (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library) (plaintiff traded over-the-counter on a different date than the defend-
ant; while discussing liability under section 12 of the 1933 Act, the court mentions: "Since
plaintiff purchased his shares.., in the over-the-counter market through his broker on Janu-
ary 19, 1981, and defendants did not sell those shares on that date, plaintiff cannot identify
who his seller was and lacks strict privity with the defendants." The statement that the plain-
tiff could not identify his seller may have been an unwarranted assumption by the court; it
noted "the strict privity [requirement for § 12] adopted by this circuit". Because plaintiff and
defendant were clearly not in privity, the actual party in the privity with the plaintiff was
irrelevant).
In the landmark state law case of Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659
(1933), the plaintiff purchased 700 shares of a company on the Boston Stock Exchange
through a broker. After the transaction, the plaintiff was able to discover that he was in privity
with the president and a director of the issuer. 283 Mass. at 363, 186 N.E. at 660.
In Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982), one of the
plaintiff's claims was under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933. The plaintiff had bought
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close soon after the inside trade. The plaintiffs would have to trade al-
most simultaneously with the inside trade or perhaps within a few min-
utes after the inside trade.21 As noted earlier,22 however, Judge
500 shares of Fibreboard common stock and attempted to demonstrate contractual privity
with the defendant. Id. at 1302, 1305. During the relevant period, the defendant's massive
sales constituted nearly one half of the shares traded. Id. at 1306. Nevertheless, the defendant
used only one brokerage firm and was able to offer evidence which matched the purchase by
the plaintiff's broker against a sale of an equal number of shares at the same time and price
from a brokerage firm different than the defendant's. The court held that the plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate contractual privity with the defendant. Id. at 1305-06. Suppose the sale
of an equal number of shares at the same time and price had been from the brokerage firm the
defendant used. An interesting question is whether the court would have ruled that the plain-
tiff had made a sufficient showing of contractual privity.
When institutions buy or sell large blocks of stock, the transactions are often handled by
so-called block positioning brokerage firms which specialize in handling such blocks. For a
discussion of the activity of block positioning firms, see S. MrrrRA & C. GASSEN, INVEST-
MENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 59-61 (1981); W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS
34, 48 (3d ed. 1985); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS,
DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS § 11.02, at 11-5 n.16 (1977). With such block transac-
tions, tracing the party in privity may be feasible.
In State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), one
of the defendants was Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. The fund had sold 150,000 shares of
Fluor Corporation to Manufacturers allegedly after Manufacturers had received bullish non-
public material information from executives of Fluor. The fund apparently had no trouble
locating the purchaser of the huge block. See id. at 284. For subsequent developments in
State Teachers, see 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981), 576 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and 589
F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Large block trades (10,000 or more shares per trade) consti-
tuted 49.9% of all New York Stock Exchange reported volume in 1986. This percentage was a
slight decrease from the previous year's all-time high of 51.7%. NEW YORK STOCK EX-
CHANGE, FACT BOOK 12 (1987).
In 1986, TIME reported: "Even though they control only about 33% of the equity on U.S.
exchanges, institutional investors currently make about eight out of every ten stock trades each
day." Manic Market, TIME, Nov. 10, 1986, at 64, 65.
A 1984 article stated:
The best estimate is that institutional trading accounts for at least 70 percent,
and probably close to 80 percent of the daily trading volume of companies listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. Block trades, all but a minor fraction of which can
be presumed to represent institutional trading, now account for over 50 percent of
volume.
Robinson, Institutional Investors Display Control Over Corporate Destinies, N.Y. L.J., June 4,
1984, at 27, col. 1.
At year end 1980, major institutional investors held about 35.4% of the stock listed on the
New York Exchange. During the fourth quarter of that year these investors accounted for
about 65% of the trading volume in unit terms, and nearly 72% in dollar value terms. NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 1984, at 57, 59. In the same year, 1980, block trades
accounted for about 31% of the total volume on the New York Stock Exchange. Lowenstein,
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
300 (1983). For additional discussion of the growth in institutional trading, see S. MITTRA &
C. GASSEN, supra note 20, at 57-59.
21. In a footnote, Judge Celebrezze quotes from Painter, Inside Information: Growing
Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
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Celebrezze's concurring opinion is not the law in the Sixth Circuit.
In Wilson itself, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a claim
by a plaintiff who sold about one month after the defendant's purchase. 23
A few subsequent district court decisions have confronted the issue of
when the contemporaneous class closes. In one extreme case, the defend-
ant bought between 1979 and 1983, and the plaintiff sold his stock on
April 3, 1984; naturally, the court held that the plaintiff's trade was not
contemporaneous with the defendant's transactions. 24 In another ex-
treme case, the plaintiff did not sell her shares until after commencing the
lawsuit, four to five months after the defendant's last purchase of stock
allegedly based on nonpublic information. 25 Not surprisingly, the court
held that the plaintiff was not a contemporaneous trader.2 6
Another opinion held that the purchase of stock seven trading days
after the insider's sale was not sufficiently contemporaneous to confer
standing to sue.27 The decision stated that the inside sale on December
8, 1977 took place "some seven trading days" before the plaintiff's
purchase on December 16, 1977.28 The court probably meant six trading
days. Language in the opinion also implies that the period of "contem-
poraneousness" in a heavily traded stock would be shorter than in a
lightly traded stock.29
In Backman v. Polaroid Corp.,3° one of the defendants allegedly sold
stock on nonpublic information on January 18, 1979. The court held
that a plaintiff who exercised a call option on January 22, two trading
days later, and a plaintiff who bought stock on January 29, seven trading
1361, 1378 (1965): "[A]II those who sold while the defendant was purchasing should be ac-
corded equal rights of recovery." 542 F.2d at 324 n.5 (emphasis added).
22. See supra text accompanying note 10.
23. Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1981).
The court did mention: "[T]he [Shapiro] district court on remand interpreted this language
["during the same period"] to refer to the period of time from the defendants' trades to the
public disclosure of the insider information, but the entire period in that case was only four
days." Id. at 94. (citation omitted). This dictum is too vague to be interpreted as a definition
of "contemporaneous" as "within four days." Contra Pietrzak & Ray, Private Litigation In-
volving Insider Trading, 20 REv. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 43, 37 n.36 (1987) (summa-
rizing Wilson as follows: "recovery only allowed on trades contemporaneous with those of
insider, i.e. within approximately four days after those trades").
24. Polak v. Continental Hosts, Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
25. Sanders v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 945, 949-50, 962-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 730 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 963.
27. Kreindler v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 98,312, at 91,960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 91,962.
30. 540 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D. Mass. 1982).
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days later, both traded "outside of the period of insider trading, ' 31 in
other words, not contemporaneously.
Another district court, however, has held that a plaintiff's purchase
on December 18, 1985 was "unquestionably contemporaneous with de-
fendants' December 9, 18 and 19 sales."'3 2 Apparently, the court as-
sumed that transactions on the same day must be contemporaneous. 33
An indirect definition of "contemporaneous" appears in State
Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corporation.34 Allegedly on the ba-
sis of material, nonpublic information, one defendant purchased Fluor
stock during two periods in 1975: March 4 through March 6 and March
10 through April 11. The plaintiff class sold Fluor stock during the pe-
riod March 3 through March 6.35 Relying on both Wilson and Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers, Inc.,36 the defendant argued that the ceiling on liability
should not be the defendant's total profit; instead, the ceiling should be
only the profit the defendant realized during March 4 through March 6,
the only time when the defendant traded "contemporaneously" with the
plaintiff class. Although the court ultimately rejected the defendant's in-
terpretation of Elkind, the court did assume that the defendant's trades
from March 10 through April 11 were not contemporaneous with the
plaintiff's trades from March 3 through March 6.37 In other words, a
trade on March 10 is not "contemporaneous" with a trade on March 6.
Another district court opinion is ambiguous on the meaning of the
term "contemporaneous." In O'Connor & Associates v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,38 the various defendants allegedly traded within an eight
calendar (six trading) day period (February 27, 1981 to March 6, 1981).
The proposed plaintiff class consisted of those who traded during a seven
calendar (five trading) day period (February 27, 1981 to March 5,
1981).39 The court ruled: "[The defendants'] trades clearly were suffi-
31. Id. at 671.
32. Froid v. Berner, 649 F. Supp. 1418, 1421 n.2 (D.N.J. 1986).
33. Surprisingly, the court did not discuss whether the plaintiff's December 18 purchase
preceded or followed the defendant's December 18 sale. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
34. 589 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
35. Id. at 1270-71.
36. 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980). Elkind limited an inside trading defendant's
liability for damages to the inside trading profits. For discussion of Elkind's "profit disgorge-
ment" ceiling on an inside trader's liability, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1276-79, 1283.
37. State Teachers Retirement Board, 589 F. Supp. at 1270-72.
38. 559 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
39. Id. at 802. As discussed earlier, the court held that the class representative,
O'Connor & Associates, could not sue a defendant who traded after the class representatives
last trade. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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ciently contemporaneous with those of the class members to permit a
finding of liability under Wilson." 4
This language has two, alternative interpretations. On the one
hand, the court may have felt that a defendant's trade on February 27,
the beginning of the seven day period, was contemporaneous with a
plaintiff's trade on March 5, the end of the seven day period. On the
other hand, the class representative, O'Connor & Associates, apparently
traded throughout the period during which the defendants traded.41
Thus, O'Connor's trades may have been close in time to those of all of
the defendants. Therefore, under virtually any definition of "contempo-
raneous," O'Connor was an adequate class representative. If a defendant
who traded on February 27, for example, felt that she should not be lia-
ble to the entire plaintiff class, that defendant could move to divide the
plaintiff class into subclasses at a later stage.42 This second interpretation
of the ambiguous language seems the more likely. Therefore, O'Connor
sheds little light on the time limits on "contemporaneousness. '43
III. Must "Contemporaneous" Traders Transact in the Same
Place As the Inside Trader?
If the defendant buys IBM stock on the New York Stock Exchange
40. Id. at 805 n.5 (emphasis added).
41. See id. at 802.
42. Cf id. at 806 n.8 (certain defendants argued that they should only be liable to certain
members of the proposed class; the court replied that this argument was relevant to the issue of
whether subclasses would be appropriate); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 36, 39
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("As there are numerous defendants in Class II it is necessary to define the
class of plaintiffs to whom each defendant may prove liable.") (emphasis added).
43. In the course of denying a motion to dismiss an inside trading suit as premature, a
district court, in In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec. Litig., refused preliminarily to impose a
"contemporaneous" requirement of four days. [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) q 98,838, at 94,317 (E.D. Mo. 1982). Indeed, at such a preliminary state of litigation,
the court seemed unwilling even to decide whether to endorse the Wilson "contemporaneous"
limitation. Id. The opinion does not indicate whether the "four days" involved were trading
or calendar days. (For a report of an earlier opinion in the same case, see In re McDonnell
Douglas Corp. Sec. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 613, 618-19 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (refusing to decide whether
to endorse the Wilson "contemporaneous" limitation). Subsequently, the same district court
interpreted Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 846 (1983), as recognizing that the "causal nexus requirement goes at least as far as
the 'contemporaneous trading rule.' "). In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec. Litig., 587 F.
Supp. 625, 630 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
A very old opinion, predating Wilson and even Shapiro, refused to allow rule lob-5 recov-
ery to a plaintiff who bought on November 12, thirteen calendar days after October 30, the
date on which the defendants allegedly sold based on nonpublic information. Joseph v. Farns-
worth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 705-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam,
198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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based on nonpublic information, the question arises whether the defend-
ant is liable to "contemporaneous" sellers of IBM in all markets, includ-
ing the regional stock exchanges, the over-the-counter market, or even
foreign stock exchanges. 44 One leading commentator has answered this
question in the affirmative.45
Dictum in the Eighth Circuit decision of Laventhall v. General Dy-
namics Corp. 46 may suggest a contrary conclusion. In this case, the issue
was whether a defendant who bought common stock was liable to sellers
of call options on the stock.47 The plaintiff brought a class action on
behalf of all persons who sold call options of General Dynamics between
December 6, 1978 and January 4, 1979, the period during which General
Dynamics allegedly had been buying its own stock on the open market
knowing of a pending cash dividend and stock split.
The court denied standing to the plaintiffs:
[t]he sine qua non in every private action under section 10(b) is unau-
thorized trading of securities in the same market as the persons dam-
aged .... Here defendant's purchase of stock, if done wrongfully as
claimed, could not in any way be asserted as the basis for plaintiff's
alleged loss because the parties were not dealing in the same market.48
The Eighth Circuit found support for this statement in Wilson's con-
temporaneous trading requirement. 49 Nevertheless, the court's principal
rationale was that Chiarella v. United States50 requires a "special rela-
44. Cf Gordon v. Hunt, 98 F.R.D. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). An action was brought against
various individuals and the commodities exchanges on which they traded alleging manipula-
tion of silver market. Class certification was only appropriate as to those who, like class repre-
sentative, traded on Comex under rule 23. The plaintiff (who traded on the Comex) was not
typical of traders on other exchanges, such as CBOT and MidAmerica, because separate de-
fenses might be available to the different exchanges and because of the factual difficulty of
proving that action in one exchange injured traders on another.) Id. at 580.
45. 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 20, § 62, at 3-257 n.39 (2d ed. rev. 1986) ("If a plaintiff
traded in one market and would have been within the class protected if he traded on the same
market as the defendants, then he should nevertheless be protected.").
46. 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
47. Id. at 410. An option is the right to purchase or sell a particular security at a specific
price within a set period of time. A "call" option gives the owner the right to buy. A "put"
option gives the owner the right to sell. In 1982, section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was amended to include expressly any put, call, or option in the definition of
"security." Pub. L. No. 97-303, § 1, 96 Stat. 1409 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1982)). For a general discussion of options, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 251 & n.6 (1983) and Wang, supra note 3, at 1238 n.60.
48. Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 412 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 414. The opinion also quotes from Judge Celebrezze's concurrence in Fridrich
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 327 (6th Cir. 1976). 704 F.2d at 414.
50. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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tionship" between the plaintiff and the defendant.5 1 This relationship
was absent because the plaintiffs option-sellers and the defendant stock-
purchaser traded on different markets.5 2
Laventhall did not involve a plaintiff who traded the same security
on a different market than did the defendant (e.g., the Pacific Stock Ex-
change versus the New York Stock Exchange). The plaintiff in
Laventhall traded a different security with a different issuer on a different
market.5 3 The opinion's requirement that a plaintiff trade in the "same
market" is ambiguous. The phrase "same market" may mean the world-
wide market for a given security, for example, the worldwide market for
IBM common stock.5 4 Alternatively, the phrase may mean a particular
place of trading, in other words, a particular specialist or market-maker.
Under the latter interpretation, the dictum would preclude a plaintiff
from suing an inside trader even when the plaintiff trades the same secur-
ity (as the defendant) around the same time but at a place different than
that of the defendant's trade.
IV. Must "Contemporaneous" Traders Buy or Sell the Same
Class of Security of the Issuer as That Bought or Sold
by the Inside Trader?
Closely related to the "same market" issue is the question whether a
defendant who trades one class of security of an issuer is liable to con-
temporaneous traders of another security or class of security of the same
issuer. Apparently, no reported decision has addressed this issue.55
51. Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 411-12. For a general discussion of Chiarella's "special rela-
tionship" requirement, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1269-71.
52. Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 411-12. For criticism of this holding, see Note, Laventhall v.
General Dynamics Corporation: No Recovery for the Plaintiff-Option Holder in a Case of In-
sider Trading Under Rule 10b-5, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 780, 786-808 (1984).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 56-69.
54. At one point, the court seems to so define "same market": "[h]ad plaintiff been con-
temporaneously trading in the same market, that is, buying and selling common stock at the
same time defendant was trading .... Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 412.
55. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal.1976),
contains ambiguous language on the issue of whether a plaintiff who trades one class of secur-
ity can sue an inside trader of another class of security of the same issuer. The case arose
before the Second Circuit decision in Wilson, but after the Second Circuit decision in Shapiro.
In Equity Funding, the inside trading defendants allegedly sold various classes of Equity
Funding securities (including both stock and bonds) based on material nonpublic adverse in-
formation passed to them by Raymond Dirks. Id. at 174-75. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court exonerated Dirks of rule lob-5 liability. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
The Equity Funding district court agreed with Shapiro that inside traders should "be
liable for breach of the duty they owed 'to all persons who during the same period purchased
[EFCA securities] on the open market without knowledge of the material information which
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The next subsection discusses a related issue, whether a plaintiff who
trades an option can sue an inside trader of stock. A few district courts
have allowed such suits. These courts might be receptive to allowing a
plaintiff who trades one class of security (for example, a convertible pre-
ferred or convertible debenture) to sue an insider trader of stock of the
same issuer.
V. Must "Contemporaneous" Traders Buy or Sell a Security
With the Same Issuer as the Security Bought or Sold
by the Inside Trader?
Clearly, someone who sells the stock of Apple Computer cannot sue
an inside purchaser of IBM common stock. Nevertheless, a seller of a
call option on IBM stock may attempt to sue someone who buys IBM
common stock based on material, nonpublic information. The call op-
tion is issued not by IBM, but by an independent party (generally the
Options Clearing Corporation). 56 Thus, the common stock and the op-
tion have different issuers. As discussed above, 57 the Eighth Circuit has
held that option-sellers cannot sue a defendant who sells common stock
based on material, nonpublic information.58 Earlier, a district court in
the Eighth Circuit had taken a different approach but then reversed its
position after the Eighth Circuit opinion in Laventhall.59
was in the possession of defendants.'" 416 F. Supp. at 185 (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974)) (material in brackets in origi-
nal). The Equity Funding district court's bracketed reference to all classes of Equity Funding
securities is ambiguous. The court probably meant that inside traders of bonds were liable to
plaintiff traders of bonds and that inside traders of stock were liable to plaintiff traders of stock.
It seems unlikely that the court meant that an inside trader of any security of Equity Funding
was liable to those trading any Equity Funding security around the same time as the inside
trade.
56. See Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 410; Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154,
157 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985). For a general discussion of options, see supra note 47.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
58. Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 414-15. See generally In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec.
Litig., 567 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (the plaintiff sold options and sued some defendants
for selling stock on nonpublic information and other defendants, including the corporation, for
failure to disclose material adverse information; the plaintiff conceded that the inside trading
claims were foreclosed by Laventhall, but the court extended Laventhall to preclude the non-
disclosure claims as well).
59. Compare In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Securities Litigation, [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,838, at 94,317-18 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (The court allowed
two classes of plaintiffs to sue defendants who allegedly sold stock based on inside information.
The two classes of plaintiffs were (1) purchasers of common stock, and (2) purchasers of op-
tions. According to the court, "[t]he action for improper insider trading protects security hold-
ers under the 1934 Act, and both option and stock purchasers have here alleged the same core
of operative facts to pose liability." Id. at 94,318 (emphasis original).) with In re McDonnell
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Another district court gave an option-trader standing to sue an in-
side trader of stock. One of the plaintiffs in that case purchased call
options on Polaroid stock, and two of the defendants sold Polaroid stock.
The court refused to dismiss the option-buyer's complaint against the
alleged inside traders of stock:
[c]all options are 'securities' within the meaning of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 .... Although ... [the plaintiff option-buyer] may have
difficulty in establishing that he was damaged by the [inside stock]
trading .... he does state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
the motion to dismiss must be denied .... 60
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 added the following sec-
tion to section 20(d)the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of, material nonpublic information would violate, or result
in liability to any purchaser or seller of the security under any provi-
sion of this title, or any rule or regulation thereunder, such conduct in
connection with a purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege with respect to such security or with respect to a group or
index of securities including such security, shall also violate and result
in comparable liability to any purchaser or seller of that security under
such provision, rule, or regulation.61
In short, section 20(d) makes unlawful the trading of options while in
possession of material, nonpublic information where trading in the un-
derlying security would be unlawful. 62 Nevertheless, the private civil lia-
bility of such an unlawful option trader is unclear.
The next to the last line of the provision contains the ambiguous
phrase "that security." This term could mean either the underlying stock
or the option. If "that security" means the stock, the provision would
have the following meaning:
Wherever an inside trader of stock would be civilly liable to purchasers
or sellers of stock, an inside trader of options on the stock shall be
liable to the same purchasers and sellers of the stock (to which the
insider trader of stock would be civilly liable).
Under this first interpretation, an inside trade of an option (on common
stock) would result in the identical private civil liability as an inside trade
Douglas Corp. Secs. Litig., 567 F. Supp. 126, 127 (E.D. Mo. 1983) ("IThe option purchaser
has no standing to sue with respect to insider transactions in shares.").
60. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667, 671 (D. Mass. 1982) (citations
omitted).
61. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 5, 98 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d)
(Supp. III 1985)) (emphasis added).
62. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing
Law, 37 VAND. L. REy. 1273, 1290 (1984); see 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25,
1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell); 130 CONG. REC. 58913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement
of Sen. D'Amato).
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of the stock. In the Second Circuit, the inside trade of the stock would
result in civil liability to "contemporaneous" traders.63 Accordingly,
under section 20(d), an inside trader of an option would be liable to con-
temporaneous traders of the stock.64
If the phrase "that security" (in the next to the last line of section
20(d)) means the option, the provision would have the following
meaning:
Wherever an inside trader of stock would be civilly liable to purchasers
or sellers of stock, an inside trader of options on the stock shall have
liability to purchasers and sellers of options comparable to the liability
an inside trader of stock has to purchasers or sellers of stock.
Under the second interpretation, if the inside trader of stock would be
liable to contemporaneous traders of stock, the inside trader of options
would be liable to contemporaneous traders of options.65
Section 20(d)'s earlier references to "security," however, all mean
the underlying security, not the option. Therefore, the text strongly sug-
gests the first interpretation of the phrase "that security" (as the stock).
Nevertheless, the second interpretation of the phrase "that security"
(as the option) has the more sensible result. The legislative history of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 clearly supports this interpreta-
tion of the phrase "that security" (as the option). In 1984, Senator Al-
fonse D'Amato was chair of the Subcommittee on Securities of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. When the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act was introduced on the floor on the Senate,
Senator D'Amato's remarks in support of the bill included the following
illustration of the effect of section 20(d):
For example, if, in a given set of circumstances, a corporate officer
would violate the antifraud provisions by purchasing any securities is-
sued by his employer, subjecting himself to liability to selling share-
holders, then he would violate the antifraud provisions to the same
extent by purchasing options with respect to these securities, and sub-
63. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
64. Conceivably, however, the Supreme Court might ultimately hold that an inside trader
of stock is liable not to contemporaneous traders but only to the party in contractual privity
with the inside trader. For an argument that the Supreme Court opinion of Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230-33 (1980), suggests that an inside trader is civilly liable only
to the party in contractual privity with the inside trader, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1270-71,
1281, 1284, 1316-17. If the Supreme Court were to so hold, the ironic result of this first inter-
pretation of § 20(d) would be that an inside trader of an option would not be civilly liable for
damages to anyone. The option trader would not be in privity with any purchaser or seller of
the stock.
65. If the inside trader of stock would be liable solely to the party in contractual privity
(see supra note 64), the inside trader of an option would be liable solely to the party in privity
also.
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ject himself to comparable liability to selling option holders and other
similarly situated persons in the derivative market. 66
Section 20(d) was added by the Senate to a House-passed bill.67 In
1984, Congressman John Dingell was chair of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce. When Congressman Dingell introduced the final
version of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 on the floor of the
House, he included in his remarks an attached explanation of various
Senate amendments (in the absence of a report by the Senate Banking
Committee or a House-Senate conference report). Included in this at-
tached explanation was the example (verbatim) given by Senator
D'Amato and quoted above. 68
In summary, the text of section 20(d) suggests the first interpreta-
tion of "that security" (as the stock), but the legislative history clearly
indicates the second interpretation: "that security" (as the option). Be-
cause of the clear legislative history and the more sensible result, Con-
gress must have intended the second interpretation of "that security,"
which results in an inside trader of options having liability to buyers and
sellers of options comparable to the liability an inside trader of stock has
to buyers and sellers of stock.
An interesting question is whether section 20(d) preempts other civil
liability. If not, an inside trader of options might be liable for damages to
private plaintiffs under the "common law" of rule lOb-5. 69 Unfortu-
66. 130 CONG. REC. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (em-
phasis added). But cf Note, Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5: A Policy, Doctrinal, and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1959, 1962 (1987) (erroneously stating that section 20(d)
applies only to SEC enforcement suits).
67. See 130 CONG. REc. H7757 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statements ofReps. Broyhill
and Dingell); 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
§ 9.21[14], at 9-126.3 (1986); Bloomenthall, Insider Trading Update, 7 SEc. & FED. CORP. L.
REP. (Clark Boardman) 1, 6-7 (Jan. 1985).
68. 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
69. One issue in Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154, 163-64 (N.D. Ill.
1985), was whether the plaintiff option-traders could sue inside traders of options who traded
contemporaneously with the plaintiffs. Although the case was decided after the passage of the
Inside Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, the court did not mention the statute. Instead, based on
the "common law" of rule lob-5 after Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the
district court refused to dismiss the complaint and held that a plaintiff option-trader can sue a
contemporaneous inside trader of the same type of option. 627 F. Supp. at 163-64 (citing
O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
and Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1983)). Bianco in-
volved an issue different than that discussed in this section. The issue in this section (and in
Laventhall and Backman) is whether an option trader can sue a defendant trader of stock.
Bianco involved option traders suing other option traders.
See generally In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 743 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (in the course of approving a settlement, discussing general issue of whether options
traders have standing to maintain a § 10(b) claim); In re Digital Equip. Corp. Sec. Litig., 601
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nately, the "common law" rule of lOb-5 liability of inside traders of op-
tions remains largely undeveloped.
Conclusion
Although identifying the party in contractual privity with an inside
trader may not be as difficult as many commentators believe,70 one ra-
tionale for permitting contemporaneous traders to sue is that the use of
this criterion avoids this potential problem. Judge Celebrezze's concur-
rence in Fridrich endorsed the contemporaneous trader class of plaintiffs
in part because of the problem of identifying who was "on the other side"
of the inside trade.71
If the rationale underlying the "contemporaneous" class of plaintiffs
is the difficulty of ascertaining the party in privity, all those who might
have been in privity would be allowed to sue.72 The "contemporaneous"
period would be quite short, perhaps within one hour or even a few min-
utes after the inside trade. Furthermore, contemporaneous traders
would include only those trading the same class of security in the same
place as the inside trader. For consistency, these plaintiffs could be al-
lowed to sue a stock market inside trader even when the party in privity
is identifiable. Unfortunately, the pivotal Second Circuit decision, Wil-
son, does not mention as a rationale the possible difficulty of identifying
the party in contractual privity.73
F. Supp. 311, 315 (D. Mass. 1984) (allowing option purchasers to sue for alleged affirmative
misrepresentations by Digital Equipment Corp., the issuer of the underlying stock).
70. See supra note 20.
71. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text.
One commentator has creatively interpreted unclear language in Laventhall v. General
Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1983), as requiring that the plaintiff demon-
strate the possibility of contractual privity in a suit for damages against an inside trader. See
Note, supra note 52, at 799 ("Taking the Laventhall approach to its logical conclusion, the
mere possibility of privity between the shareholder and the defendant would mean that a
shareholder does have standing to sue."); idt at 804 ("The essence of the resulting hybrid rule
[in Laventhall] is that where there is no possibility of privity, there can be no showing of
causation, even if contemporaneous trading occurred."); id. at 806 ("Shareholders who traded
contemporaneously with the defendant had standing because the shareholders had the chance
of being in privity .. "). This interpretation of Laventhall is strained. For a discussion of
Laventhall, see supra text accompanying notes 46-54, and 57-58.
73. See Wilson, 648 F.2d at 94-95.
In O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 800, 805 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), the defendant argued that an inside trader of options should be liable only to the party
in privity. The reason was that, unlike a stock trade, the party on the other side of an option
trade can be readily identified. The court rejected the defendant's argument and held that an
inside trader of options should be liable to contemporaneous traders of options:
Although the Court of Appeals did note in Shapiro the practical difficulties of match-
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The meaning of "contemporaneous" is important in actions against
an inside trader by both private plaintiffs and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. In private suits for damages, the Second Circuit
has limited a defendant's liability for damages to the inside trading
profit.74 The plaintiffs share these profits pro rata. Because each plaintiff
is not entitled to actual damages, the exact contours of the plaintiff class
does not affect the liability of the defendant in the Second Circuit. The
definition of the class, however, does determine who may recover.
When the SEC sues an inside trader, the Commission sometimes
requests disgorgement of profits to "contemporaneous" traders.75 In
ing particular sales with particular purchases, the Court's decision was based primar-
ily not on that rationale but rather on the conclusion that "it would make a mockery
of the 'disclose or abstain' rule if we were to permit the fortuitous matching of buy
and sell orders to determine whether a duty to disclose had been violated.
O'Connor, 559 F. Supp. at 805 (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974)).
In 1976, a district court in the Ninth Circuit also confronted an argument by inside trad-
ing defendants that they should be liable only to the parties in privity. Apparently, the parties
in privity were identifiable. Indeed, certain plaintiffs claimed to be the actual purchasers of
certain blocks sold by the defendants. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F.
Supp. 161, 174-75 (C.D. Cal. 1976). This case arose before the Second Circuit decision in
Wilson but after the Second Circuit decision in Shapiro. The California district court agreed
with Shapiro that an inside trader should be liable not only to the parties on the other side of
the inside trade but to alI persons who "during the same period" engaged in transactions
opposite in type to the inside trade. Consequently, the district court held: "Even if these
transactions [block trades to identifiable plaintiffs] turn out to be the only sales by these de-
fendants... they can also be liable for breach of the duty they owed 'to all persons who during
the same period purchased.., on the open market without knowledge of the material informa-
tion which was in the possession of defendants.' "). 416 F. Supp. at 185 (quoting Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974)).
74. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discus-
sion of Elkind's ceiling on liability, see Wang, supra note 3, at 1276-79, 1283.
75. See, e.g., SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Call
Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1985-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,484, at 92,929 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (consent decree providing for disgorge-
ment to "persons who traded directly with the defendants as well as persons trading contem-
poraneously with the defendants" who can show they suffered a "loss" as a result of the
transactions), aff'd, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,250 (2d Cir. 1987); SEC v. Voigt
(S.D. Ind. 1982), SEC Litig. Release No. 9613 (March 12, 1982), 24 SEC Docket 1657, 1658
(consent decree pursuant to which inside trading defendants disgorged profits to those "who
sold the target securities at the time when the defendants were purchasing such securities
... ."). Cf. SEC v. Andes, No. 82-1659, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed
library) (consent decree with "a plan of disbursement which would allocate pro rata the dis-
gorged funds among those identifiable individuals who purchased Franklin Mint common
stock on the dates when the defendants were alleged to have sold their common stock while in
possession of material insider information."; the court noted: "Although compensation of in-
jured investors is not the primary purpose of disgorgement, it is a valid secondary purpose, and
infact most courts do order that disgorged proceeds be distributed among injured investors.");
SEC v. Reed, 97 F.R.D. 746, 747-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (describing consent decree providing for
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such cases, the meaning of "contemporaneous" is important in determin-
ing the precise decree requested by the SEC and issued by the court.
disgorgement of inside trading profits into escrow account for satisfaction of any judgment or
settlement in pending class action on behalf of those who traded contemporaneously with de-
fendant; any residue would be used to satisfy any other action against defendant; the summary
of this opinion in United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 691 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985), states that, according to Reed, he deposited funds
into the escrow account with the understanding that any ultimate residue would go to charity);
SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court held that inside trading defend-
ants violated rule 10b-5; SEC sought disgorgement of profits to "defrauded public investors";
court ordered that "[t]he trustee [of the disgorgement fund] shall use his best efforts to locate
those members of the public who sold Harvey's shares during the period from January 6, 1971
[date of the first inside trade] to February 18, 1971 [date of last inside trade] and pay each
person so located ... an amount to be determined by the trustee to be equitable and fair."),
aff'd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK 299
(1987) ("While the SEC has long maintained that its disgorgement actions are enforcement
actions designed to deter unlawful trading and not simply collection efforts on behalf of injured
investors, as a practical matter the disgorgement funds are almost always used to compensate
investors who claim injury resulting from the violation (presumably in a collateral private
action).") (footnote omitted); Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading-Part
L" Regulation Under the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus.
LAW. 223, 245 (1985) (Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law, A.B.A.) ("The SEC typically requests that disgorgement be
made to a fund from which those persons who can prove that they were damaged by the
violations may recover.... ."). But cf SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90,
102 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he primary purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate investors.
Unlike damages, it is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was
unjustly enriched .... ); SEC v. Materia, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 99, 583 at 97, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[T]he purpose of the disgorgement is not to take
care of anybody's damages but rather to insure that no one profits by wilful violations."), aff'd,
745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984). See generally Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions
Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641; Comment, The Measure of Disgorgement in SEC
Enforcement Actions Against Inside Traders Under Rule 10b-5, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 445
(1985).
Nevertheless, in disgorgement actions brought by the Commission, consent decrees have
sometimes provided that the inside trading profits be paid to those in contractual privity with
the inside trader. For examples, see SEC v. Griffith (N.D. Ga. 1983), SEC Litig. Release No.
10,072 (July 20, 1983), 28 SEC Docket 608; SEC v. Baranowicz (C.D. Cal. 1982), SEC Litig.
Release No. 9704 (June 29, 1982), 25 SEC Docket 1051; SEC v. Acki (S.D.N.Y. 1980), SEC
Litig. Release No. 9139 (July 23, 1980), 20 SEC Docket 831; SEC v. National Kinney Corp.
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), SEC Litig. Release No. 9118 (June 30, 1980), 20 SEC Docket 595. But cf.
SEC v. Courtois, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,000 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (Defendant faced both criminal charges brought by U. S. Attorney and civil complaint
brought by SEC. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court initially ordered disgorgement of
inside trading profits into a fund to be distributed to parties in contractual privity with inside
traders or, if that was not feasible, to the U.S. Treasury. The Special Escrow Agent reported
that it was not feasible or practicable to distribute the disgorgement fund to parties in privity
with inside traders; the court agreed with this finding and ordered disgorgement fund paid to
U.S. Treasury). In some other instances, consent decrees have provided for disgorgement to
the "sellers" or "buyers" without indicating which sellers of buyers; apparently, the terms
"sellers" and "buyers" meant those in contractual privity with the inside trading defendant.
For examples, see SEC v. Spiker (E.D. Wa. 1984), SEC Litig. Release No. 10444 (July 2,
August 1987] "CONTEMPORANEOUS" TRADERS
Unfortunately, only a few opinions have addressed the meaning of
"contemporaneous," and almost all of these decisions were reached by
district courts. A clearer definition would aid the courts, the SEC, and
private plaintiffs.
1984), 30 SEC Docket 1343, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,580; SEC v.
Krutt (S.D. Fla. 1979), SEC Litig. Release No. 8861 (Sept. 6, 19979), 18 SEC Docket 269. Cf.
SEC v. Drew Nat'l Corp. (D. D.C. 1975), SEC Litig. Release No. 6695 (July 18, 1975), 7 SEC
Docket 449 (consent decree placed disgorged profits in an account to provide funds for pay-
ment of adjudicated or settled claims arising out of defendants' alleged inside trading); SEC v.
Satenstein (S.D.N.Y. 1975), SEC Litig. Release No. 6746 (Feb. 19, 1975), 6 SEC Docket 335
(consent decree provided for disgorgement to "those investors who had been defrauded by
these defendants."). Most of the above orders were made before Wilson was decided in 1981.
For a general discussion of consent decree procedure, see M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA,
SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT §§ 3.64, 3.65 (1985).
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